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The aim of this exploratory paper is to discuss a sometimes recognized but still under-appreciated parallel 
between group agency and artificial intelligence. As both phenomena involve non-human goal-directed 
agents that can make a difference to the social world, they raise some similar moral and regulatory 
challenges, which require us to rethink some of our anthropocentric moral assumptions. Are humans 
always responsible for those entities’ actions, or could the entities bear responsibility themselves? Could 
the entities engage in normative reasoning? Could they even have rights and a moral status? I will 
tentatively defend the (increasingly widely held) view that, under certain conditions, artificial intelligent 
systems, like corporate entities, might qualify as responsible moral agents and as holders of limited rights 
and legal personhood. I will further suggest that regulators should permit the use of autonomous artificial 
systems in high-stakes settings only if they are engineered to function as moral (not just intentional) agents 
and/or there is some liability-transfer arrangement in place. I will finally raise the possibility that if artificial 
systems ever became phenomenally conscious, there might be a case for extending a stronger moral status 
to them, but argue that, as of now, this remains very hypothetical.  
1. Introduction 
Group agency and artificial intelligence are two much discussed phenomena. The first consists 
in the fact that certain organized collectives, such as corporations, courts, and states, can 
function as intentional, goal-directed agents in their own right, over and above their individual 
members, often with considerable power and influence in the world.1 The second consists in 
the fact that computational or robotic systems increasingly display autonomous behaviours and 
cognitive and practical capacities similar in some respects to those traditionally associated with 
humans. 2  Examples range from driverless cars and self-navigating drones to autonomous 
systems in medical, financial, military, and other high-stakes settings. But while group agency 
and artificial intelligence have each received much attention, the two phenomena are less often 
considered together. As a theorist of group agency, I see a salient parallel between them, and 
the aim of this exploratory paper is to discuss this parallel and to draw attention to some lessons 
for ethics and artificial intelligence that can be learnt from it. In particular, the established work 
on group agency offers a useful template for thinking through some of the moral and regulatory 
challenges raised by artificial intelligence. The parallel has been recognized before, notably in 
                                               
* This work was presented at the workshop on “Artificial Agency and Collective Intelligence”, Trinity Hall, 
Cambridge, September 2017, at the Political Theory workshop at the Forschungskolleg Humanwissenschaften, 
Bad Homburg, February 2018, and as the 9th Munich Lecture in Business Ethics, February 2019. I am grateful to 
the participants for helpful comments and feedback. 
1 See, e.g., French (1984), Rovane (1997), Pettit (2001, ch. 5, 2003), Tollefsen (2002, 2015), List and Pettit (2006, 
2011), and Tuomela (2013). My discussion of group agency and group responsibility also draws on List (2019). 
2 For overviews, see Russell and Norvig (2009), Winfield (2012), and Boden (2016).  
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philosophical work by Migle Laukyte and in legal work by Lawrence Solum, and there is also 
much interest among artificial-intelligence researchers in the theme of multi-agent systems. 
But the parallel nonetheless warrants further discussion.3   
In brief, the parallel lies in the fact that group agency and artificial intelligence each involve 
entities distinct from individual human beings that qualify as intentional agents, capable of 
acting more or less autonomously in pursuit of certain goals and making a difference to the 
social world. If such non-human agents can make high-stakes decisions and perform actions 
on their own, we must answer some salient moral and regulatory questions, which are 
surprisingly similar in the corporate and artificial cases. Are corporate and artificial entities 
proper targets for the attribution of responsibility? Could they be moral agents, not just 
intentional ones? Could they engage in normative reasoning? Could they attain some kind of 
legal personhood status and have certain rights? Might we even have to care about them?  
In Sections 2 and 3, I will introduce group agency and artificial intelligence in more detail. 
In Section 4, I will explain the parallel from a conceptual perspective and suggest that group 
agency can be interpreted as a special case of artificial intelligence. In Sections 5 and 6, I will 
defend the view that, under certain conditions, artificial entities, like corporate agents, may 
qualify as bearers of responsibility and as holders of limited rights and legal personhood, and 
I will suggest that regulators should demand that when autonomous artificial systems are used 
in high-stakes settings, they should be engineered to achieve moral – not just intentional – 
agency. As a backup, there should be liability-transfer arrangements in place. I will further 
raise the possibility that if we ever encountered phenomenally conscious AI systems, they 
might become candidates for a stronger moral status, but emphasize that this scenario remains 
very hypothetical. In Section 7, finally, I will look at the bigger picture for ethics. One lesson 
is that if we take the arrival of novel, non-human agents seriously, we may have to adjust some 
of our conventional anthropocentric approaches to morality and regulation so as to 
accommodate new loci of moral agency, responsibility, and even rights.  
                                               
3 The most extensive prior discussion of this parallel that I am aware of can be found in Laukyte (2014, 2017), 
where themes similar to the present ones are addressed, drawing on the theory of group agency in List and Pettit 
(2011). That said, I developed my account of the parallel independently, and the motivating example of an agent 
in the List-Pettit book itself is a robot. The parallel was also implicit in the themes of the 2017 Cambridge 
workshop at which the present work was first presented (see the acknowledgment note) and was one of the 
motivations for an LSE workshop on “The Politics and Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence” in June 2014 that I 
co-organized with Kai Spiekermann. An earlier discussion of the parallel from a legal perspective can be found 
in the work of Lawrence Solum on AI legal personhood, which is often modelled on the idea of corporate legal 
personhood. See especially Solum (1992), as well as follow-up contributions. There is sizeable literature in 
computer science and artificial intelligence on multi-agent systems, though that literature typically focuses more 
on the interplay between multiple agents and less on the question of the emergence of intentional agency at the 
level of the multi-agent system as a whole. See, among others, Chopra, van der Torre, and Verhagen (2018). 
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2. Group agency 
Group agency is the phenomenon that suitably organized collectives can constitute intentional, 
goal-directed agents in their own right, over and above their individual members.4 Examples 
are firms and corporations, collegial courts, universities, churches, NGOs, and even states in 
their entirety. We tend to ascribe beliefs, desires, and other intentional attitudes to such entities, 
and treat them as loci of agency, sometimes even as artificial persons with obligations and a 
legal status, as distinct from the obligations and status of the people who belong to them.  
At first, one might think that the ascription of agency and intentional attitudes to certain 
collectives is just a metaphor. Saying that Microsoft intends to increase profits is a shorthand 
for saying that the managers, board members, or shareholders have this intention. Likewise, 
saying that the Roman Catholic Church is committed to certain values is a shorthand for saying 
that individual clergymen and other Catholics have those commitments. But there is a fairly 
straightforward indispensability argument for treating group agency as not just metaphorical 
but real. According to this argument, a realist view about group agency is supported by the way 
we speak about many collectives in ordinary as well as social-scientific discourse. Our best 
social-scientific theories represent some collective entities as goal-directed agents and explain 
their behaviour by using the same concepts and categories that we use to explain individual 
behaviour. For example, the theory of the firm in economics and “realist” theories of 
international relations apply standard rational-actor models to firms and states. In fact, a profit-
maximizing firm may be a more fitting case of a homo economicus, a self-interested utility-
maximizing rational agent, than any individual human being is. And strategic interactions 
between states, such as between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, 
are often modelled as games with strategically rational players. Similar points apply to the way 
political scientists think about parties and other organizations in politics.  
The following argument summarizes the case for realism about group agency:5 
Premise 1: The ascription of intentional agency to certain organized collectives is 
explanatorily indispensable if we wish to make sense of their behaviour. 
Premise 2: If the ascription of some property to an entity is indispensable for explaining 
that entity’s behaviour, then we have a provisional justification for assuming that the 
entity really has that property.  
                                               
4 Recall the references in footnote 1. 
5 For an earlier version of this argument, see List (2018). The argument is also implicit in other works on group 
agency, including Tollefsen (2002) and List and Pettit (2011). 
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Conclusion: We have a provisional justification for assuming that the collectives in 
question really have the property of intentional agency. 
Premise 1 is a partly empirical and partly methodological claim about the social sciences. 
Premise 2 follows from a broader philosophical principle known as the “naturalistic ontological 
attitude”.6 That principle asserts that when we seek to answer ontological questions about 
which entities and properties are real in any given domain, we should consult our best scientific 
theories of that domain and be guided by considerations of explanatory indispensability. For 
example, the fact that postulating gravity and electromagnetic fields is indispensable for 
explaining certain physical phenomena gives us a provisional justification for thinking that 
gravity and electromagnetism are real. The justification is provisional, because there might still 
be special reasons for doubting our best scientific theories in the relevant domain, and those 
theories remain open to revision. But, in the absence of any contrary reasons, we are warranted 
in taking the ontological commitments of our best theories at face value. If we accept Premises 
1 and 2, then we must recognize group agency as a real phenomenon, at least provisionally.  
To be sure, the present argument supports realism about group agency only for those 
collectives for which the ascription of agency is explanatorily indispensable. Firms and states 
are plausible examples. Unorganized collectives and random collections, such as the collection 
of pedestrians on the street at this moment, would not qualify, as we would not get any 
explanatory benefit from ascribing agency to them. Similarly, not every case of cooperative or 
coordinated activity produces a group agent. When workers go on strike or villagers cooperate 
in providing some public good, the locus of agency remains the individual, even if the 
participants jointly bring about some aggregate effect, receive some gains from cooperation, 
and/or share certain intentions. Such collective or joint actions may be ingredients in the 
implementation of group agency (since organized collectives often rely on collective or joint 
action), but collective or joint action alone is insufficient for group agency.7 
3. Artificial intelligence 
Artificial intelligence (AI) is the increasingly ubiquitous phenomenon that some artificial (e.g., 
computational or robotic) systems display certain cognitive capacities and/or autonomous 
agency that are in some respects analogous to the cognitive capacities and/or agency of humans 
                                               
6 See, e.g., Quine (1977) and Fine (1984). 
7 On collective action, see, e.g., Olson (1965) and Ostrom (1990). On joint action, see, e.g., Bratman (1999, 2014), 
Gilbert (1989), and Tuomela (2007). On norm-governed multi-agent interactions, see also Boella and van der 
Torre (2007). 
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or other animals. Defining artificial intelligence by reference to cognition or agency is very 
common. For instance, Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig define the subject of AI as “the study 
of agents that receive percepts from the environment and perform actions”.8 Depending on 
which cognitive and agential capacities we focus on, we get more or less demanding definitions.  
Examples of AI systems range from driverless cars, autonomous air vehicles (drones), 
medical helper robots, diagnostic devices, and financial trading systems, all the way to chess-
playing computers, navigation devices, sophisticated vending machines, and even robots that 
can autonomously assemble IKEA furniture.9 The first few examples display greater autonomy 
and flexibility than the last few, which are more specialized.  
A familiar distinction is that between “weak” and “strong” AI. “Strong AI” refers to 
machine intelligence comparable in sophistication, flexibility, and/or generality to human 
intelligence. “Weak AI” refers to machine intelligence “weaker” than human intelligence, for 
instance in the sense of being more specialized and less flexible. Strong AI on a par with human 
intelligence is not yet a reality (and a controversial notion), and it is not clear how soon it is 
likely to be developed, if at all.10 The term “artificial superintelligence”, finally, refers to (so 
far, extremely hypothetical) AI systems whose capacities exceed human ones.11  
Even though human-like AI is still elusive, the cognitive and agential capacities of AI 
systems are getting more sophisticated. As such systems attain greater autonomy and decision-
making power, they raise new ethical and regulatory challenges. While early AI systems had 
only limited capacities and tended to be employed only in very controlled environments, we 
increasingly face the arrival of AI systems that make high-stakes decisions and operate more 
autonomously in less controlled environments.12 If a system has only limited capacities, such 
as a robotic floor cleaner or a pre-programmed factory robot, or if its use has no serious spill-
over effects beyond a restricted environment, as in the case of an automated train in a tunnel, 
then it does not give rise to qualitatively novel risks, compared to earlier technologies. Of 
course, the large-scale use of such systems may raise legitimate concerns about automation-
driven job losses, but labour-market implications of new technologies are not unprecedented. 
By contrast, if an AI system operates relatively freely in a largely uncontrolled environment, 
                                               
8 See Russell and Norvig (2009). An account of AI in terms of agency can also be found in Laukyte (2014, 2017). 
9 On the last example, see, e.g., Chokshi (2018).  
10 Arguably, intelligence is best understood, not as one-dimensional, but as a cluster of capacities, with multiple, 
perhaps independent components: mathematical-logical, linguistic-verbal, musical, artistic-creative, motor-
control, mind-reading etc. In line with this, Pinker (2018, p. 298) describes the concept of artificial general 
intelligence as “barely coherent”, also quoted by Aaronson at <https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=3654>.  
11 On artificial superintelligence, see, e.g., Chalmers (2010) and Bostrom (2014). 
12 For discussion, see, e.g., Fisher, List, Slavkovik, and Winfield (2016). 
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as in the case of a driverless car or a fully autonomous drone, or if it can make high-stakes 
decisions on its own, as in the case of some medical, financial, and military systems, then the 
societal implications are qualitatively novel. We are then dealing with artefacts as genuine 
decision-makers, perhaps for the first time in human history. My focus in this paper is on such 
systems, which can make decisions with non-trivial stakes and operate relatively autonomously. 
The challenges raised by systems with more limited capacities and less autonomy are not my 
topic here, as they are less novel. Moreover, some of those weaker systems might be best 
viewed as advanced tools, not as genuinely autonomous agents.  
4. The key parallel 
The key parallel between group agency and artificial intelligence, as anticipated, lies in the fact 
that both phenomena involve entities distinct from individual human beings that qualify as  
goal-directed, “intentional” agents, with the ability to make a significant difference to the social 
world.13 As we will see later, those entities are not thereby guaranteed to qualify as moral 
agents too, which is a more demanding requirement than intentional agency alone. 
To develop the parallel, let me give a more precise definition of intentional agency. An 
intentional agent is an entity, within some environment, that meets at least three conditions:14 
• It has representational states, which encode its “beliefs” about how things are. 
• It has motivational states, which encode its “desires” or “goals” as to how it would like 
things to be. 
• It has a capacity to interact with its environment on the basis of these states, so as to 
“act” in pursuit of its desires or goals in line with its beliefs.  
To give a simple example: I believe that there is tea available in the kitchen; I desire to drink 
tea; I then act by going to the kitchen to get some tea. My action is explained – in fact, 
rationalized – by my beliefs and desires, and this pattern applies more generally. 
Consistently with these conditions, agents can vary considerably in their capacities and 
sophistication. Their cognitive make-up can range from simple to complex. Human beings, the 
most familiar agents, have many psychological states beyond beliefs and desires. These include 
emotions, hopes, fears, and various subconscious mental states. Adult human beings also have 
the capacity for normative reasoning, on top of their more mundane capacities. But although 
human beings stand out, entities ranging from non-human animals to autonomous robots and 
                                               
13 As noted, this parallel is also discussed in Laukyte (2014, 2017). 
14 I here build on List and Pettit (2011, ch. 1) and List (2018). The notion of a “belief-desire agent” goes back to 
David Hume. For an influential account of “belief-desire-intention agency”, see Bratman (1987). 
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organized collectives can meet the agency conditions too. Behavioural ecologists often study 
animal behaviour using game theory and other theories involving the attribution of goal-directed 
agency to the animals in question. And, as already noted, robots and AI systems, as well as 
corporate entities, are routinely viewed as agents in the relevant fields of study. So, we can 
certainly think of AI systems and group agents as intentional agents of a non-biological sort.15  
The parallel is further reinforced if we look at the most famous test for artificial intelligence, 
the “Turing Test”, and compare it with a prominent test for intentional agency, the “intentional 
stance” test, proposed by Daniel Dennett, which is often also applied to organized collectives. 
Let’s begin with the Turing Test. Alan Turing argued that, to determine whether a system is 
“intelligent”, we should ask whether its behaviour leads a human observer to believe that it has 
human-like cognitive and agential capacities.16 Specifically, Turing suggested that we should 
replace the hard question “Can machines think?” with the more tractable question “Are there 
imaginable digital computers which would do well in the imitation game?”, where this means 
displaying behaviour that is indistinguishable, in an observer’s eyes, from that of an intelligent 
agent.17 Different specifications of the imitation game correspond to different versions of this 
test. In Turing’s own version, the system must imitate the responses of a human interlocutor in 
written communication via an instant-messaging system. But other, less demanding versions 
are also conceivable. A Turing Test for self-driving cars might focus on whether a self-driving 
car can imitate the behaviour of a human-operated car, even in complex traffic situations.   
Let’s compare this with the “intentional stance” test for agency.18 For Dennett, the criterion 
for whether an entity is an intentional agent is whether we can make sense of its behaviour by 
viewing it as an intentional agent. As he puts it, “[a]nything that is usefully and voluminously 
predictable from the intentional stance is, by definition, an intentional system.”19 Taking the 
“intentional stance” towards an entity means interpreting it as if it were an intentional agent 
and then explaining and predicting the entity’s behaviour on that basis. If this strategy works, 
the entity qualifies as an intentional agent; if not, then not. In the case of most inanimate 
systems, such as the solar system, a volcano, or the earth’s atmosphere, Dennett’s criterion is 
not met. We are better off taking a “physical stance” towards them: explaining them as systems 
governed by physical laws of nature and causal mechanisms. In the case of a human being or 
complex animal, however, Dennett’s criterion is met and vindicates the presence of intentional 
                                               
15 For a useful discussion, see also Dretske (1999).  
16 See Turing (1950). 
17 Ibid., p. 442. 
18 See Dennett (1987). 
19 See Dennett (2009, p. 339).  
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agency. Similarly, as theorists of group agency have argued, firms, corporations, and other 
organized collectives are “usefully and voluminously predictable from the intentional stance”.20  
To see the similarity between the “intentional stance” test for agency and the Turing Test 
for intelligence, consider the relationship between  
(i) successful interpretability as an agent, and  
(ii) doing well in a corresponding suitably specified imitation game.  
One may expect (i) to be correlated with (ii). Any entity that is successfully interpretable as an 
agent is likely to do well in an imitation game designed to test for the relevant agential 
capacities, and any entity that does well in this imitation game is likely to be successfully 
interpretable as an agent.   
While both Turing and Dennett, in effect, propose interpretivist accounts of agency, I prefer 
a stronger realist account. On an interpretivist account, to be an agent is to be successfully 
interpretable as an agent. For me, interpretability as an agent is evidence for agency, but not 
conceptually the same as agency. On my stronger realist understanding, to be an agent is to 
satisfy the three conditions for agency introduced above. So, while from an interpretivist 
perspective successful interpretability as an agent is constitutive of agency, for me it is merely 
indicative. That an entity is interpretable as an agent is good evidence for the hypothesis that it 
satisfies the agency conditions. Irrespective of whether we go with an interpretivist criterion or 
my preferred realist one, however, the fact that sophisticated AI systems and suitably organized 
collectives meet criteria (i) or (ii) supports the claim that they each qualify as agents.21   
In fact, group agents can be viewed as special cases of AI systems, where the “hardware” 
supporting their artificial intelligence is social rather than electronic. Rohit Parikh has coined 
the term “social software” to capture the idea that certain social phenomena can be understood 
as computational processes implemented in social systems. Parikh uses this term to refer to a 
broad range of social phenomena, such as procedures and institutions, voting systems, and 
other mechanisms, and he does not focus on group agency.22 But, consistently with Parikh’s 
usage, the idea that group agents are socially implemented AI systems seems quite natural. As 
functionalist philosophers of mind have long argued, agency is a multiply realizable 
phenomenon: it can be realized by different “hardware systems”. The foregoing discussion 
illustrates that agency admits at least three different kinds of hardware: biological, as in the 
case of human beings and non-human animals; electronic, as in the case robots and other AI 
                                               
20 See Tollefsen (2002, 2015) and List and Pettit (2011). 
21 Tollefsen (2015) defends group agency from an interpretivist perspective. 
22 See Parikh (2002). 
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systems; and social, as in the case of group agents. The boundaries between these three kinds 
of hardware may become increasingly blurred with the arrival of new (often controversial) 
technologies, from biological robotics and human enhancement to technologically augmented 
social systems.  
While the main parallel between group agency and artificial intelligence consists in the 
instantiation of agency beyond the human individual, there are other parallels too. Group agents 
and AI systems each have an internal architecture – social in the one case and computational 
in the other23 – and it may be illuminating to compare these architectures, perhaps applying the 
computational paradigm suggested by Parikh’s notion of social software. For instance, group 
agents and AI systems each tend to receive and aggregate inputs from different sources. To 
function well, they each need to satisfy certain rationality conditions at the level of the entity 
as a whole. They must each revise or update their beliefs in response to input from the 
environment. And so on. But these more technical parallels are not my focus here, and I just 
flag them as issues for further investigation. I want to move on to the moral and regulatory 
challenges raised by group agents and AI systems.   
5. Challenges related to responsibility  
5.1. Responsibility gaps in group agency and AI 
Group agents have considerable power and influence in the world and can cause significant 
harms. States can wage wars and do many things that affect the lives of their citizens and others. 
Likewise, corporations can affect people’s well-being through their business decisions and 
sometimes even cause disasters. Think of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico 
in 2010, caused by the drilling operations of a multinational corporation, or the deforestation 
caused by big industry. As is widely recognized, in the case of such harms, it is sometimes 
difficult to identify one or several individuals to whom all of the relevant responsibility can 
reasonably be attributed. The sum-total of individual responsibility may intuitively fail to do 
justice to the full amount of the harm caused. There is then a shortfall of attributed 
responsibility: a “responsibility gap” or “responsibility void”.24  
                                               
23 In the case of group agency, French (1984) speaks of the “corporate internal decision structure” and List and 
Pettit (2011) speak of the group’s “organizational structure”, with a special emphasis on aggregation functions. 
Parallels between the constitution of a social entity and that of a mind were also discussed by Minsky (1986). 
24 See, among others, Braham and van Hees (2011), Collins (2017, 2018), and Duijf (2018). On corporate 
responsibility more generally, see French (1984), Erskine (2001), Copp (2006), Pettit (2007), and List and Pettit 
(2011, ch. 7), among others. For an overview, see Smiley (2017). 
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Philip Pettit gives the example of the Herald of Free Enterprise, a passenger ferry which 
sank in the English Channel in 1987, killing almost two hundred people. 25  An inquiry 
concluded that the ferry company was very sloppy and had terrible safety procedures. In a 
commentator’s words, “[f]rom top to bottom the body corporate was infected with the disease 
of sloppiness”.26 Yet, despite a complex legal aftermath, no-one was found legally responsible 
to an intuitively appropriate extent. There was a shortfall in legally attributable responsibility, 
since the ferry company was not treated as a locus of responsible agency.27 The focus on 
individual responsibility meant that the systemic failure at the collective level fell below the 
law’s radar screen. 
What should we say in such cases? One possibility is to deny that there is any form of 
responsibility other than individual responsibility. We would then have to do our best to 
identify all the individuals who can be held responsible for at least parts of the harm caused, 
but if the sum-total of their responsibility falls below the amount of responsibility we would 
intuitively like to attribute, we would have to accept that there is no more responsibility to be 
assigned. The situation would be akin to a natural disaster or fluke accident, where despite the 
regrettable harm no responsibility can be attributed to anyone, aside from possible 
responsibility for damage prevention and disaster response.  
However, there is an important difference between natural disasters and corporate harms. 
While in a natural disaster the relevant harms cannot normally be traced back to intentional 
actions, corporate harms have an agential source: they stem from the actions of a group agent. 
For this reason, theorists of group agency often argue that we should treat corporate entities as 
loci of responsibility themselves, over and above their members. In the example of the ferry 
company, the responsibility gap might have been avoided by holding the company itself 
responsible for its sloppy procedures. The assignment of corporate responsibility may be 
combined with appropriate sanctions at the corporate level: targeting, for instance, the assets 
of the corporation or its operating permissions.   
Let me now turn to the case of AI. As AI systems are becoming increasingly ubiquitous as 
well as powerful, there are bound to be some responsibility gaps too. If AI systems operate 
autonomously in high-stakes settings, in areas ranging from transportation and medicine to 
finance and the military, the occurrence of some harms is inevitable in practice.28 Just think of 
                                               
25 See Pettit (2007) and also List and Pettit (2011, ch. 7). 
26 See Colvin (1995), quoted also in Pettit (2007). 
27 Ibid. 
28 See, e.g., Matthias (2004), Sparrow (2007), and Broersen (2014). 
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all the things that might go wrong with self-driving cars, military drones, autonomous financial 
trading systems, and diagnostic systems or helper robots in medicine. In the case of such harms, 
we cannot assume that full responsibility can always be attributed to human operators, 
developers, owners, or regulators. Rather, it is conceivable that, in some cases, the sum-total 
of human responsibility will intuitively fail to do justice to the full amount of the harm caused. 
If this happens, we are faced with a responsibility gap. Perhaps all humans involved – the 
system’s operators, developers, owners, and regulators – were sufficiently diligent and acted 
conscientiously, and nonetheless the AI system, perhaps due to some unforeseeable dynamics, 
caused a harm. A high level of complexity and autonomy will almost inevitably go along with 
a certain degree of unpredictability. Andreas Matthias describes the problem as follows: 
“Traditionally, the manufacturer/operator of a machine is held (morally and legally) 
responsible for the consequences of its operation. Autonomous, learning machines, based 
on neural networks, genetic algorithms and agent architectures, create a new situation, 
where the manufacturer/operator of the machine is in principle not capable of predicting 
the future machine behaviour any more, and thus cannot be held morally responsible or 
liable for it. The society must decide between not using this kind of machine any more 
(which is not a realistic option), or facing a responsibility gap, which cannot be bridged 
by traditional concepts of responsibility ascription.”29  
Although it is contentious whether unpredictability alone is enough to absolve manufacturers 
and operators of responsibility (I would argue it is not), AI-related responsibility gaps 
nonetheless seem possible, and so we need to take a stand on them. Should we insist that, 
beyond the responsibility that can reasonably be assigned to the human operators, owners, 
manufacturers, and regulators, there is no further responsibility to be assigned? On this view, 
the resulting harms would be on a par with those caused by a natural disaster or fluke accident. 
Or should we attribute responsibility to the AI systems themselves? At first sight, the idea of 
assigning responsibility to an AI system may seem far-fetched and unduly anthropomorphist, 
but I want to suggest – in line with the views of Laukyte, Solum, and others – that AI 
responsibility, like corporate responsibility, might be defensible.30   
                                               
29 See Matthias (2004, p. 175).  
30 See, in particular, Laukyte (2014, 2017) and Solum (1992), as cited earlier. 
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5.2. Why corporate and AI responsibility cannot be reduced to human responsibility 
Before explaining the case for AI responsibility on the model of the more familiar notion of 
corporate responsibility, it is worth addressing the objection that each of these purported forms 
of responsibility can be reduced to human responsibility. Let’s begin with corporate 
responsibility. Group agents are collections of individuals. A group agent cannot act unless 
some of its members act; what a group agent does is determined by what the members do, 
under the relevant organizational structure.31 Since the members are themselves responsible 
agents, so the objection goes, they must therefore be responsible for the group’s actions.   
This objection, however, misses a key conceptual point about group agency. In the case of 
genuine group agency, as opposed to mere collective or joint action, the collective constitutes 
a new locus of agency, distinct from the agency of any of the individual members. The fact that 
those individuals causally or even constitutively contribute to the group’s corporate actions 
does not imply that those actions can also be agentially attributed to them. If we take the logic 
of group agency seriously, we must not treat the actions of the group agent as the actions of its 
members. It is a contingent matter whether, and how, the members are involved in a group 
agent’s actions qua responsible agents and not merely qua causal contributors or qua 
ingredients in the group’s organizational structure, perhaps even unwittingly or involuntarily. 
Arguably, the members can be held responsible for a group agent’s actions only to the extent 
that they have played certain normatively relevant roles:32   
• an enacting role, for instance as a knowing, willing, and uncoerced manager, official, or 
representative of the group agent,  
• an authorizing role, for instance as a director, board member, owner, share-holder, or 
regulator, or  
• an organizational-design role, for instance as a founder, framer, policy maker, or 
institutional designer. 
There is no reason to expect that the sum-total of the members’ responsibility due to those roles 
will always be commensurate with the total amount of corporate responsibility we might 
ideally like to attribute. Thus, responsibility gaps remain possible. 
Let me now turn to AI responsibility. Here one might raise a similar objection. One might 
argue that, since AI systems are always developed, built, owned, and operated by humans, AI 
responsibility must ultimately be reducible to human responsibility. Again, the objection 
                                               
31 On this “determination” or “supervenience” thesis, see List and Pettit (2006, 2011). 
32 See also List and Pettit (2011, ch. 7) and List (2019). 
 13 
misses a key point, namely that, no matter how AI systems have been brought into existence, 
systems above a certain threshold of autonomy constitute new loci of agency, distinct from the 
agency of any human designers, owners, and operators. In fact, such systems can arguably 
become even more autonomous than group agents. Setting aside hybrid systems such as drones 
operated by remote human pilots, AI systems do not require human participation in the same 
way in which group agents do. Once in operation, AI systems can potentially operate with little 
or no human input. Furthermore, approaches such as evolutionary computing might bring into 
existence AI systems that have no human designer or operator at all: they may have evolved in 
an artificial environment. And so, there is no conceptual reason to think that the responsibility 
of AI systems will always be reducible to human responsibility. 
Think of an analogy: a person’s parents play a key causal role in making him or her the 
person he or she is, but the adult human being is nonetheless an agent distinct from his or her 
parents, and parents cannot normally be held responsible for their adult children’s conduct. 
Likewise, from the fact that someone has played a role within the causal history of an AI system, 
it does not automatically follow that this person is responsible for the system’s conduct. Rather, 
it is a contingent matter to what extent other agents – individual or corporate – are responsible 
for what an AI system does. The answer will vary from case to case. As in the case of group 
agency, human responsibility may plausibly be assigned for an AI system’s actions only to the 
extent that the relevant people have played one of the following roles:   
• an enacting role, for instance as a knowing, willing, and uncoerced operator of the 
system,  
• an authorizing role, for instance as an owner, provider, or regulator, or 
• a system-design role, for instance as a creator, manufacturer, software designer, or 
policy maker. 
Crucially, there is no guarantee that the sum-total of any such agents’ responsibility will always 
be commensurate with the total amount of responsibility we might ideally like to attribute for 
an AI system’s actions. Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibility of responsibility gaps, as 
Andreas Matthias has pointed out.33  
5.3. Fitness to be held responsible in group agents and AI systems 
Attributing responsibility to corporate or artificial entities themselves would enable us to avoid 
certain responsibility gaps. But this fact alone is insufficient to establish that there truly is 
                                               
33 Recall Matthias (2004). 
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corporate or AI responsibility. It would be a mistake to derive the conclusion that an entity can 
be assigned responsibility simply from the premise that such an assignment helps us to avoid 
responsibility gaps. Even if a hurricane causes a huge amount of damage for which there is 
little human responsibility, it does not follow that the hurricane itself is a bearer of 
responsibility. Only entities with the right capacities can be bearers of responsibility. So, before 
we can assign responsibility to an entity, we must establish that this entity is of the right sort. 
What conditions must an entity meet to be “fit to be held responsible”?34 Although there is 
some room for debate here, the following seem plausible conditions:35 
Moral agency: The entity is an agent with the capacity to make normative judgments 
about its choices – judgments about what is right and wrong, permissible and 
impermissible – and to respond appropriately to those judgments.   
Knowledge: The entity has the information needed for assessing its choices normatively, 
or at least reasonable access to such information. 
Control: The entity has the control required for choosing between its options. 
For the sake of my argument, I will assume that these conditions, perhaps after suitable fine-
tuning, are necessary and sufficient for fitness to be held responsible. With regard to the first 
condition, note that intentional agency alone, without the capacity for normative judgments, is 
not enough for fitness to be held responsible. Non-human animals, for instance, are intentional 
agents but lack moral agency, and indeed they cannot be bearers of responsibility. The second 
condition rules out cases in which agents, through no fault of their own, lack certain 
information that would be needed for a normative assessment of their choices. Agents who are 
brainwashed or trapped in an informationally deprived environment may be examples. They 
wouldn’t bear responsibility – certainly not full responsibility – for choices made under such 
constraints. The third condition, finally, rules out responsibility in cases where agents lack 
control over their choices, due to external or psychological factors. If, however, an entity meets 
all three conditions, as in the case of a typical adult human being, there seems no reason to 
refrain from treating that entity as a bearer of responsibility.  
In general, it is an empirical question whether a given entity – biological, social, or 
electronic – meets the three conditions. Although, in the biological case, humans are the only 
                                               
34 I am borrowing this term from Pettit (2007). 
35 These conditions (also discussed in List 2019) are adapted from List and Pettit (2011, ch. 7), drawing, in turn, 
on Pettit (2007). Laukyte (2014, 2017) also employs variants of these conditions to argue for AI responsibility.  
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known entities satisfying them, there is no conceptual reason why non-human entities could 
not satisfy them too. In the case of group agents, it is widely accepted (especially since Peter 
French’s influential work on corporate responsibility) that at least some corporate entities are 
fit to be held responsible.36  Whether a particular organized collective, say a commercial 
corporation, meets the relevant requirements depends on how it is set up and organized.  
One crucial issue is whether the entity is not just an intentional agent but meets the stronger 
requirements for moral agency. Well-organized corporations have procedures and mechanisms 
in place that allow them to make corporate-level judgments about what is permissible and 
impermissible, and to act on those judgments. Indeed, many organizations have compliance 
departments and ethics committees.37 Such entities are what Philip Pettit calls “conversable”:38 
we can engage with them and challenge their actions on the basis of normative reasons, not 
unlike the way we engage with adult human beings. This is very different from the way we 
engage with, say, a non-intentional physical process or a non-human animal. The latter kinds 
of entities are not capable of normative reasoning. We can causally interact with them, but we 
cannot influence them by giving them normative reasons, and they would not be able to give 
us reason-based justifications for their behaviour. 
The present observations suggest a plausible regulatory requirement for the creation and 
operation of powerful group agents in society.  
A proposal: Society, via its regulatory authorities, should permit the creation and 
operation of powerful group agents, such as corporations and other organizations in high-
stakes settings, only if structures are in place to ensure their fitness to be held responsible 
for their corporate actions.39 
The idea is that an organization, if operative in a “high-stakes setting” according to society’s 
criteria, would attain its official incorporated status and operating licence only if it can show 
that it has procedures and mechanisms in place that ensure that it satisfies the three conditions 
stated above and that it therefore qualifies as a responsible moral agent. Depending on what is 
at stake, society may further impose precise restrictions on what the organization is or is not 
allowed to do and demand that the organization should have appropriate financial assets and/or 
                                               
36 Recall the references in note 6. 
37 For recent discussions of corporate moral agency, see Björnsson and Hess (2017) and Pasternak (2017). 
38 See, e.g., Pettit (2001). 
39 Along similar lines, a “developmental rationale” for holding group agents responsible is defended in List and 
Pettit (2011, ch. 7). 
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insurance arrangements such that it can be fined or made to pay compensation in cases of 
wrongdoing. In this way, society can protect itself against problematic responsibility gaps.  
Moving on to artificial intelligence, I suggest that, here too, it is an empirical question 
whether a given system satisfies the conditions for fitness to be held responsible. Obviously, 
first-generation AI systems do not come close, and even if goal-directed behaviour is common 
in AI systems, there is still a big gap between mere intentional agency and moral agency. The 
emerging research programme of “engineering moral machines” is an attempt to implement 
moral agency in AI systems: to develop AI systems that behave morally.40  
There is a pressing need to ensure that AI systems do not just pursue certain pre-
programmed goals mechanically, but that they comply with moral norms. It is inevitable that 
autonomous systems in high-stakes settings will sometimes be confronted with decisions 
requiring moral judgment. For a simple example, think of a self-driving car that has a choice 
between hitting a child on the road or swerving with the consequence of damaging the mirror 
of a parked vehicle or mildly injuring its own passengers. Given the vast number of different 
possible such situations, it is not feasible to provide the car with a complete list of definitive 
instructions in advance. Moral guidelines cannot be exhaustively enumerated like this. Rather, 
the car must have the capacity to assess the relevant situations autonomously and to arrive at 
reasonable moral decisions on its own. In short, it must engage in normative reasoning and 
achieve a certain form of moral agency.   
It should be clear that, while there are significant technical challenges here, conceptually, 
there is no reason why an AI system could not qualify as a moral agent and, in addition, satisfy 
the knowledge and control conditions I have stated. Even if existing AI systems do not yet 
meet these requirements, there is no reason to think that having an electronic or otherwise 
engineered hardware is an in-principle barrier to their satisfaction. If we acknowledge that 
group agents can qualify as fit to be held responsible, then we should be prepared to 
acknowledge that AI systems can do so too, at least in principle. In fact, if I am right that group 
agents can be viewed as socially implemented AI systems, then the familiar notion of corporate 
responsibility can already be viewed as an existing example of AI responsibility. 
In analogy to the regulatory requirement that I have endorsed in the case of group agents, 
one might propose a similar requirement for AI systems, albeit in slightly amended form: 
                                               
40 See, e.g., Broersen (2014) and Fisher, List, Slavkovik, and Winfield (2016). For an overview of the debate on 
artificial moral agency, see Fossa (2018). 
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A proposal: Society, via its regulatory authorities, should permit the use of autonomous 
AI systems in high-stakes settings only if structures are in place to ensure these systems’ 
– or at least their legal representatives’ – fitness to be held responsible for their actions.  
The idea is that the operating license for any AI system in what is deemed a “high-stakes setting” 
would be contingent on evidence that the system meets the conditions for fitness to be held 
responsible and/or that there is a full transfer of responsibility to certain legal representatives. 
The proposed form of AI responsibility may, in turn, have to be underwritten by certain assets, 
financial guarantees, and/or insurance, so that, in the event of a harm, the system or its legal 
representatives can be made to pay appropriate fines and compensation. Of course, society 
would have to decide what counts as a “high-stakes setting” for regulatory purposes. The use 
of powerful AI systems in such settings would then be prohibited by the relevant regulators 
unless these systems properly function as loci of responsible agency themselves or there is a 
full transfer of responsibility to their human legal representatives as a backup.41  
As in the case of group agents, this regulatory approach would enable society to protect 
itself against responsibility gaps. It is important that we avoid a situation in which individuals 
or corporate entities can evade liability for high-risk decisions by delegating those decisions to 
AI systems and then hiding behind the autonomy and unforeseeability of those systems’ 
behaviour. In a slogan, it should not be possible to achieve impunity for harmful actions just 
because “the algorithm did it”.  
To implement moral agency in AI systems, we would have to design those systems 
explicitly to have ethical decision-making capacities, in the same way in which corporations 
may be required to have ethical compliance mechanisms. This can be technically achieved in 
at least two ways: either by pre-programming certain moral constraints into the AI system or 
by training the system to recognize morally significant situations and to adjudicate them 
autonomously.42 The first, constraint-based approach would require the codification of the 
relevant moral norms in a machine-implementable format and programming those norms 
explicitly into the AI system. The second, training-based approach would require the use of 
                                               
41 In line with this, Sparrow (2007) argues against the use of certain forms of military AI technology. He writes: 
“the more autonomous these systems become, the less it will be possible to properly hold those who designed 
them or ordered their use responsible for their actions. Yet the impossibility of punishing the machine means that 
we cannot hold the machine responsible. We can insist that the officer who orders their use be held responsible 
for their actions, but only at the cost of allowing that they should sometimes be held entirely responsible for 
actions over which they had no control. For the foreseeable future then, the deployment of weapon systems 
controlled by artificial intelligences in warfare is […] unfair either to potential casualties […] or to the officer 
who will be held responsible for their use” (pp. 74–75). 
42 For the distinction, see Fisher, List, Slavkovik, and Winfield (2016, p. 468). 
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machine-learning techniques to recognize patterns in a database of illustrative moral decisions 
and to extrapolate those patterns to future decisions, just as AI systems can learn to recognize 
patterns on chest x-rays, given a sufficiently large database of images paired with 
corresponding diagnoses (an instance of “supervised learning”). For instance, a self-driving car 
might be trained using a database of thousands of traffic situations paired with information 
about the morally desirable response in each situation.  
Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages. Under the constraint-based approach, 
it may be easier to verify in advance that the system will be norm-compliant, but as moral 
philosophers recognize, the systematic codification of moral norms is extremely difficult. 
Under the training approach, it may be easier to emulate human moral judgments, provided the 
training database is large enough, but it is harder to verify the system’s reliability in advance. 
In short, there may be a trade-off between verifiability and moral adequacy. More research is 
needed to make progress here. 
A further strategy, beyond engineering AI systems to behave morally, is to require that AI 
systems be equipped with an “ethical black box”, as proposed by Alan Winfield and Marina 
Jirotka.43 This is “the equivalent of a Flight Data Recorder to continuously record sensor and 
relevant internal status data”. It enables investigators to reconstruct the AI system’s internal 
decision-making process in the context of any accident.44 Winfield and Jirotka argue that this 
is “an essential part of establishing accountability and responsibility” in robots and autonomous 
systems, and that “without the transparency afforded by an ethical black box, [such] systems 
are unlikely to win public trust”.45 
Finally, in those cases in which it is unrealistic to turn AI systems into genuinely responsible 
agents but we still wish to use such systems, it may be appropriate to introduce a regime of 
strict liability for their operation, akin to strict-liability regimes in other industries, such as the 
food industry. Under a strict-liability regime, the owners or operators of any AI system would 
be liable for any harms done by the system, even if no fault, negligence, or intention by those 
owners or operators can be established. A strict-liability regime might plausibly incentivize the 
development of AI systems that are as safe as possible, and it would be likely to prompt owners 
and operators to purchase insurance to cover any residual risks. However, it is important for 
society to decide if (and when) AI systems should ever be admitted as genuine decision-makers 
in high-stakes settings if they do not display at least a modicum of moral agency. 
                                               
43 See Winfield and Jirotka (2007). 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
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The bottom line is that, in the case of AI as much as in the case of group agency, careful 
regulation is needed to avoid situations in which responsibility gaps can occur by accident or 
in which risky decisions are delegated to non-human decision-makers in order to minimize 
human responsibility for any harms. AI systems that qualify as responsible moral agents, like 
corporate moral agents, might, in turn, achieve what Philip Pettit calls “conversability”: we 
would be able to scrutinize and seek justifications for their actions through the lens of 
normative reasons, rather than merely engage with them in a causal or mechanical manner. 
6. Challenges related to rights and moral status 
6.1. Corporate and AI rights and legal personhood   
If we regard some corporate entities and AI systems as moral agents who are fit to be held 
responsible, should we also give them rights?46 Should we agree, for instance, with the Citizens 
United decision of the US Supreme Court, which gives relatively broad free-speech rights – 
exercisable via monetary spending – to commercial corporations and other organizations? And 
should we then extend those rights to AI systems, a serious question in a world of Twitter bots 
and automated contributors to social media feeds? Moreover, should we treat group agents and 
AI systems as persons of their own, akin in some respects to human persons? 
At first sight, the idea of giving rights not just to corporations but also to AI systems may 
seem preposterous, and the idea that such entities could attain some kind of moral status seems 
even more far-fetched. However, consider the functions performed by corporate entities in 
modern societies: the state provides vital services, law-enforcement agencies uphold the law, 
universities educate people, and corporations and banks – despite some of their negative 
aspects – play important roles in the economy. It is widely recognized that those entities would 
not be able to perform those functions if they did not have at least some rights (carefully 
circumscribed rights, of course) and some associated legal status: the right to own property, 
the right to employ people and to enter contracts, the right to demand the fulfilment of certain 
obligations by others and to sue non-compliant parties in court, and so on. Indeed, corporate 
entities are routinely considered legal persons, and it is this status that qualifies them as bearers 
                                               
46 For earlier discussions of these questions in the corporate case, see, e.g., List and Pettit (2011), and in the AI 
case, see Solum (1992), Laukyte (2014, 2017), and Turner (2018). Solum and Turner discuss the case for legal 
personhood for AI, noting the parallel with corporations, and Laukyte argues that the “performative” (or 
functionalist) case for granting personhood to group agents considered in List and Pettit (2011) essentially carries 
over to AI systems.  
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of legal responsibilities and as holders of certain legal rights. To be sure, legal personhood is 
not the same as moral personhood, but it is an important status nonetheless.  
Analogously, we may wonder whether a similar legal status should be extended to AI 
systems, as they play increasingly important roles in our complex world. Perhaps some of those 
systems, too, will be able to perform some of their functions – especially future functions – 
only if they have a certain legal status and even certain rights, a possibility already entertained 
by Solum in the early 1990s.47 Presumably, we need to regulate the decision-making powers 
of AI systems in financial, medical, and military contexts. We need to specify, for instance, 
whether autonomous systems in business contexts may enter valid contracts, whether medical 
systems may prescribe medicines and perform treatments, and whether military systems may 
make certain decisions autonomously in critical situations.   
Along these lines, a 2017 European Parliament report on legal and ethical aspects of robotics 
recommends that the European Commission should explore the possibility of 
“creating a specific legal status for robots in the long run, so that at least the most 
sophisticated autonomous robots could be established as having the status of electronic 
persons responsible for making good any damage they may cause, and possibly applying 
electronic personality to cases where robots make autonomous decisions or otherwise 
interact with third parties independently”.48 
Supporters of this proposal suggest that it would be appropriate in light of the ever-growing 
range of functions performed by autonomous systems in modern societies. As a commentator 
puts it, the proposed status “could allow robots to be insured individually and be held liable for 
damages if they go rogue and start hurting people or damaging property.” And further: “Legal 
personhood would not make robots virtual people who can get married and benefit from human 
rights …; it would merely put them on par with corporations, which already have status as 
‘legal persons,’ and are treated as such by courts around the world.”49 Critics object that the 
proposal is premature, and that “[b]y seeking legal personhood for robots, manufacturers were 
merely trying to absolve themselves of responsibility for the actions of their machines”.50  
However, even if we gave legal personhood to AI systems, this would not absolve relevant 
humans – operators, manufacturers, owners, or regulators – of responsibility any more than 
                                               
47 See Solum (1992). 
48  See <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A8-2017-
0005+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>.  
49 See Delcker (2018). On AI legal personhood, see also Turner (2018). 
50 This point was made by Noel Sharkey, quoted in Delcker (2018). 
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giving legal personhood to corporations absolves directors, managers, and relevant employees 
of individual responsibility. Even if certain corporate or electronic entities are treated as legal 
persons, human beings may still be held responsible to an appropriate extent for those entities’ 
actions – namely to the extent that they have played certain normatively relevant roles, such as 
enacting, authorizing, or design roles, as discussed earlier. 
To make progress in the debate on whether corporate rights and personhood should be 
extended to AI systems, we need to say more about what granting rights and/or personhood to 
an entity means and what the justification could be.   
6.2. Rights and personhood, legal and moral 
Whenever we speak of “rights”, we must clarify at least two things. First, we must clarify 
whether we are referring to legal rights or to moral ones. To illustrate this distinction, note that 
people living under a dictatorial regime have far weaker legal rights than people living in a 
liberal democracy, but we think that their moral rights are the same, even if these moral rights 
are not respected in their society. Second, we must clarify whether we are referring to rights in 
a thin sense, understood simply as (i) deontic powers or permissions to do or claim certain 
things, or to rights in a richer sense, understood as (ii) a status in which those deontic powers 
or permissions are grounded and by reference to which they are justified.51 Let me call (i) the 
“deontic” sense of rights, and (ii) the “status” sense. Saying that someone has a right in the 
deontic sense is just another way of saying that this person has certain deontic powers or 
permissions. It carries no implication as to what the grounds of those powers or permissions 
are and how they are justified. By contrast, when we are referring to a right in the status sense, 
for instance, a natural right, a human right, or an animal right, then we are saying something 
about the grounds, or the justification, of the relevant powers or permissions. 
Similarly, the term “personhood” can be used in different senses. It can stand either for a 
legal status or for a moral one. Legal personhood consists in having a certain package of legal 
powers, permissions, and responsibilities, but it need not come with any special moral status. 
Legal persons need not have any intrinsic moral significance. Moral personhood, by contrast, 
is not a legal status but a moral one. It entails a package of moral powers, permissions, and 
responsibilities, and comes with a certain intrinsic moral significance. Moral persons are 
objects of moral concern; they matter intrinsically. 
                                               
51 For a closely related distinction, see Valentini (2018). 
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With these clarifications in place, we can see that, even if we grant legal personhood and 
legal rights to corporate entities and/or AI systems, this does not imply granting them moral 
personhood and moral rights. Moreover, giving certain deontic powers and permissions to 
corporate or artificial entities does not imply that these entities have intrinsic moral significance. 
They might be granted those powers and permissions for purely instrumental reasons, for 
instance because this helps them to perform certain useful functions in society. And they might 
be denied other powers and permissions, also for instrumental reasons. 
Let me use the term “non-derivative rights” to refer to deontic powers or permissions 
(whether legal or moral) that are justified by reference to an entity’s intrinsic moral significance, 
as in the case of human rights and (arguably) animal rights, and let me use the term “derivative 
rights” to refer to deontic powers or permissions that are justified in more indirect, typically 
instrumental way, for instance by reference to some other values or goods they promote. For 
instance, a university has certain rights – to enter contracts, to engage in certain forms of speech, 
and so on – in this derivative sense. These rights are not justified by reference to the university’s 
standing as a moral person or its intrinsic significance, which it arguably does not have, but 
rather by reference to the functions the university performs in society. In order for a university 
to fulfil its mission, which is in society’s interest, it needs to be able to employ staff, enter 
contracts, own buildings and equipment, and so on. The university’s derivative rights and 
standing as a legal person enable it to do these things effectively. What I want to suggest is this: 
A proposal: (i) Corporate and AI entities may be given derivative rights and legal 
personhood under certain circumstances, but no non-derivative rights or full-blown 
moral personhood. (ii) The criterion for deciding whether to grant certain derivative 
rights (as well as legal personhood) to such entities should be whether this promotes the 
interests of those of who matter intrinsically, paradigmatically human beings but perhaps 
also other living creatures.52 
Under this proposal, it becomes a contingent issue whether the assignment of certain rights and 
legal personhood to AI systems can be justified. The issue boils down to the question of 
whether having AI rights and legal personhood helps to promote the interests of those who 
matter intrinsically, especially human beings. If the answer is yes, then AI rights and legal 
personhood can be justified; if the answer is no, then not. I suspect that, as long as AI systems 
have only limited autonomy and limited agential capacities, the answer is no. However, with 
                                               
52 The corporate version of this proposal is in line with List and Pettit (2011, ch. 8). 
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increases in the autonomy and agential capacities of such systems, the answer could become 
yes, with the resulting rights carefully delimited.53 I believe that the present proposal, as well 
as the recognition of the distinction between non-derivative and derivative rights, could take 
some of the heat out of the debate about AI rights and personhood. The case for or against AI 
rights and legal personhood is structurally similar to the one for or against corporate rights and 
legal personhood. 
6.3. Could there ever be a case for giving non-derivative rights and a full-blown moral status 
to group agents or AI systems? 
I have emphasized that although group agents and AI systems can qualify as intentional agents 
and perhaps even as moral agents, their status is very different from that of humans and – I 
would add – non-human animals. The difference, I have assumed, lies in the fact that human 
beings and some non-human animals matter intrinsically, while group agents and AI systems 
do not. Accordingly, only humans and perhaps some other animals can have non-derivative 
rights and the relevant moral status, while group agents and AI systems can have, at most, 
derivative rights and a thinner legal status. But even if this differential treatment seems 
commonsensical, is it philosophically defensible?54  
If we thought that an entity’s moral status was grounded in that entity’s agential capacities, 
then we would have to conclude that similar agential capacities – wherever they occur – imply 
a similar moral status. And so, if group agents or AI systems were to display the same agential 
capacities as humans, we would have to extend the same rights and moral status to them. To 
be sure, the agential capacities of current corporate and AI entities fall short of human ones. 
But this is an empirical fact, which might change with new technological or social 
developments. The upshot would be that (hypothetical or future) group agents or AI systems 
with agential capacities similar to those of humans would be entitled to rights and a moral 
status similar to that of humans. 
If we find this conclusion problematic and wish to defend the claim that even group agents 
or AI systems with very sophisticated capacities should not have the same moral status as 
humans, we must find some distinguishing feature – beyond agential capacities – that accounts 
                                               
53 Solum (1992, pp. 1257–1258) makes a version of this point, noting that if “granting AIs [for example] freedom 
of speech [had] the best consequences for humans” (perhaps “because this action would promote the production 
of useful information”), then this would be an “easy justification” for giving certain rights to AI systems, without 
grounding those rights in the autonomy of the AI speakers themselves. 
54 On this debate in the corporate case, see also Pasternak (2017) and Silver (2018), who argues for extending a 
certain moral status to corporations. In the AI case, see again Solum (1992). 
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for the difference in status. The feature would have to be one which human beings 
unambiguously satisfy, and which group agents and AI systems unambiguously violate. Simply 
taking membership of the human species as a necessary condition for intrinsic moral 
significance would be rather stipulative and ad hoc, and it would amount to a philosophically 
unsatisfactory form of “human supremacism”, as Will Kymlicka has argued in another 
context.55 Among other things, it would run the risk of “throw[ing] animals under the bus”.56 
For instance, we may plausibly wish to extend non-derivative rights and an appropriate moral 
status to the great apes as well. What we need is a criterion that excludes group agents and AI 
systems from having such rights and status, while including all human beings and also making 
room for the possibility that some non-human animals could have non-derivative rights as well. 
My suggestion is the following:  
A proposal: A necessary (though perhaps not by itself sufficient) condition for having 
non-derivative rights and intrinsic moral significance is having phenomenal 
consciousness or at least having the potential for phenomenal consciousness. To have 
phenomenal consciousness, in turn, is to be an entity that has subjective experiences: 
there must be something it is like to be that entity, as Thomas Nagel famously puts it.57 
This condition is very inclusive. It is satisfied by all human beings,58 and we can safely assume 
that it is satisfied by many other sentient animals too, from chimpanzees to cats, dogs, and bats 
(as Nagel points out), though there could be some further necessary conditions for having non-
derivative rights that some or many non-human animals do not satisfy. In any case, the 
inclusiveness of the proposed condition is desirable. When it comes to deciding which entities 
are at least candidates for having rights and intrinsic moral significance, we ought to err on the 
side of inclusiveness rather than exclusiveness. At the same time, as intended, the proposed 
condition is not satisfied by group agents or by current AI systems. We have very good reasons 
to think that neither group agents nor current-generation AI systems have anything close to 
phenomenal consciousness or the potential for it. Satisfying the conditions for intentional 
agency – even for moral agency – is not the same as having first-person subjective experiences. 
Intentional agency, and moral agency as I have characterized it here, can be viewed as 
                                               
55 See Kymlicka (2017).   
56 Ibid. 
57 See Nagel (1974). For earlier discussions of this condition for non-derivative rights in the contexts of artificial 
intelligence and group agency, see, respectively, Solum (1992) and List (2018). 
58 For instance, babies undeniably have the potential for phenomenal consciousness (whether actualized or not), 
as do comatose patients, provided there is some chance they will regain consciousness. To make the criterion even 
more inclusive, we might extend the notion of “potential” to include “past potential” as well.  
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“functionalist” phenomena – phenomena that lend themselves to a third-personal scientific 
study – while phenomenal consciousness, by being first-personal, is not like this. Phenomenal 
consciousness is logically distinct from, and goes beyond, intentional or moral agency.59 
The main reason for believing that neither group agents nor current AI systems have 
phenomenal consciousness is that the kinds of physical conditions which, according to recent 
neuroscience, are associated with phenomenal consciousness and which can be found in the 
brains of mammals, are not present in corporate institutional structures or in the conventional 
computer systems underlying existing AI technologies. In particular, we have reason to believe 
the following: 
An empirical premise: Consciousness occurs only in highly integrated information-
processing systems with massive internal high-bandwidth feedback mechanisms, of the 
kind we find in the mammalian cortex. This special kind of informational integration is 
nowhere to be found in existing corporations or conventional computers.60 
This is certainly not a conceptual truth, but it is an empirical claim that seems supported by our 
current best neuroscientific understanding of the correlates of consciousness. 
Now comes an important, albeit very hypothetical point: if there ever were corporate entities 
or AI systems exhibiting the consciousness-supporting physical conditions – such as highly 
integrated information-processing with high-bandwidth internal feedback, on a par with what 
goes on in a mammalian cortex – then we would have to conclude that those entities have the 
potential for phenomenal consciousness. And so, they could become candidates for having 
intrinsic moral significance and non-derivative rights, at least as far as the proposed necessary 
condition is concerned. I consider this a very hypothetical scenario, but it is worth reflecting 
about it for a moment. 
In the corporate case, it seems unlikely that we could ever design an organized collective – 
a corporation or similar – in such a way as to replicate the kind of massively integrated 
information processing characteristic of a biological cortex.61 Conceivably – though this is 
philosophically controversial – the so-called “China brain” thought experiment, described by 
Ned Block, might illustrate a phenomenally conscious collective.62 In this thought experiment, 
                                               
59 See, e.g., Chalmers (1996). 
60 I am here relying on integrated information theory (e.g., Tononi and Koch 2015), though other theories of 
consciousness (including the neural synchronization theory defended in Crick and Koch 1990) might support 
similar conclusions. For discussion, see List (2018) and Schwitzgebel (2015). 
61 See List (2018). Cf. Schwitzgebel (2015). 
62 See Block (1980).  
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each member of a very large population (say, billions) is given the task of simulating the 
behaviour of one neuron in a biological brain, and the appropriate neural connectivity is then 
achieved via something like the internet. But existing corporate structures do not remotely 
resemble anything like this, and so we can set the possibility aside as speculative science fiction.  
In the AI case, however, the situation is potentially different. Even though current AI 
technologies do not appear to instantiate the consciousness-supporting physical conditions, 
technologies such as biological or biomorphic computing, in which computer systems are built 
around a neural-network structure, might plausibly support the kind of massively integrated 
information processing that appears to underpin consciousness in a biological cortex. If this is 
so, then we cannot rule out the possibility of phenomenally conscious AI from the outset. 
Indeed, scientific projects such as the EU-funded Brain Simulation Project are attempts to 
create a reasonably faithful computer simulation of a human brain.63 If my analysis is right, 
then those projects and similar developments may have serious ethical implications. Future AI 
systems with brain-like features might have the potential for phenomenal consciousness, and 
so they might become candidates for having intrinsic moral significance and some non-
derivative rights.64 In ethical terms, this is completely uncharted territory. 
7. The bigger picture 
Traditionally, we have tended to assume that human beings are the primary – or even only – 
powerful agents occupying the social world and that, although non-human animals can be 
intentional agents too, moral agency is a uniquely human phenomenon. Furthermore, we have 
tended to assume – especially outside animal-rights or deep-ecology circles – that human 
beings are the only entities that have intrinsic moral significance and non-derivative rights, so 
that the class of moral agents and the class of those with intrinsic moral significance do not 
come apart too significantly. 65  Arguably, the latter class (of beings with intrinsic moral 
significance) is larger than the former (of moral agents), since there are some humans, such as 
new-born babies or people with certain impairments, who do not currently meet all the 
functional conditions for the full exercise of moral agency but who, of course, have rights and 
entitlements as well as intrinsic moral significance. And many of us would further wish to 
include some non-human animals in the class of beings with intrinsic moral significance. That 
said, our established moral codes are relatively anthropocentric, and the philosophical quest to 
                                               
63 See <https://www.humanbrainproject.eu/en/brain-simulation/>. 
64 Basl and Schwitzgebel (2019) have independently made a similar point. 
65 On animal rights, see, e.g., Gruen (2017). 
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identify the conditions for moral agency and the grounds of an entity’s moral status has largely 
boiled down to finding a good justification for the status quo or perhaps some more enlightened 
version of it.66 
As my discussion, like earlier discussions of group agency and AI in the literature, should 
illustrate, the arrival of new complex intentional agents – whether corporate or artificial – raises 
several challenges for the status quo: 
Additional powerful agents: The class of powerful agents occupying the social world 
and making high-stakes decisions may increasingly include a variety of non-human 
entities, corporate or artificial. 
New responsibility gaps: If we do not carefully implement the kinds of regulatory 
proposals sketched above – making sure that powerful corporate and artificial agents are 
designed to satisfy the requirements for fitness to be held responsible – we run the risk 
that certain high-stakes decisions are made by intentional systems that are unaccountable. 
This may create new responsibility gaps. 
Moral agents without intrinsic moral significance: While traditionally all moral agents 
have been human and thus entities with intrinsic moral significance, some new moral 
agents – corporate or artificial – may come into existence which lack such a moral status 
and matter only derivatively. 
Non-human users of morality: While, traditionally, moral principles and theories have 
always been developed for a human audience – with humans as their target users – we 
will now need to develop moral principles and theories for some non-human users: 
corporate entities and AI systems. This raises the question of whether our largely 
anthropocentric moral codes are fit for purpose or whether the fact that the addressees of 
morality may include non-human entities changes the way in which moral principles and 
theories should be formulated, codified, and transmitted. 
New entities with intrinsic moral significance: In case phenomenally conscious AI 
systems ever come into existence, we might need to recognize such entities as candidates 
for having intrinsic moral significance and certain non-derivative rights – an entirely new 
situation. We must also ask which norms and standards govern the permissibility of 
bringing such entities into existence. 
                                               
66 On the grounds of moral status, see Jaworska and Tannenbaum (2018). 
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All this suggests that our moral theories and regulatory frameworks should be “future-proofed”: 
they need to be reassessed with a view to making them adequate even in a world in which some 
of these challenges materialize. This might require a wider “reflective equilibrium” in our 
thinking about agency, moral status, and the function of morality for regulating behaviour. 
Undoubtedly, this paper has flagged more questions than it has answered. But these questions 
should have a firm place on our agenda for discussion, and my programmatic aim has been to 
make them more salient: we must give greater attention to the ways in which group agency and 
artificial intelligence introduce new loci of agency into our social world.  
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